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ABSTRACT
The courts are continuing to allow greater participation in the justice system by experts. 
Expert evidence is admissible in court whenever there are matters or issues which require 
their expertise in terms of observation, analysis, description and resolution. In medical 
negligence litigation, the ‘Bolam’ test is cited as the starting point. The test requires doctors 
to conform to a ‘responsible’ body of medical opinion. However, it has failed to define what 
a ‘responsible’ body of medical opinion is. The article aims to examine the role of expert 
evidence in medical negligence litigation cases. The scope of this article is limited to expert 
evidence in medical negligence litigation in Malaysia in the context of the standard of care 
required from doctors in the course of treatment, diagnosis and provision of information 
to their patients. The methodology is a legal, library-based research focusing mainly on 
primary and secondary sources. The findings indicate a need for reforms such as improving 
the quality of medical expert witness testimony by strengthening the qualifications for 
serving as a medical expert and providing more specific guidelines that govern the conduct 
of physicians throughout the legal process. 
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INTRODUCTION
In medical negligence litigation, a key 
step is for the claimant to prove the doctor 
failed to meet the required standard of care. 
The traditional test in law in such cases is 
what is known as the Bolam test to prove a 
doctor is not negligent if what he/she has 
done is endorsed by a responsible body of 
medical opinion in the relevant specialty at 
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the material time (Bolam vs Friern Hospital 
Management Committee (1957) 2 All ER 
118). The standard has been criticised 
as one set by the medical profession and 
evidenced by expert testimony with minimal 
court scrutiny, and it has been suggested 
that stricter evaluation of such opinion is 
timely (Teff, 1998). The decision in Bolitho 
v City and Hackney Health Authority 
[(1992) PIQR P334, (1997) 39 BMLR 1, 
HL] suggests that the court should adopt 
a more interventionist stance in assessing 
expert evidence and in setting the standard 
of care. One such approach towards a more 
objective measure in determining the legal 
standard of care could be through the use of 
clinical guidelines.
In Malaysia, the tort system regulates 
and governs medical negligence litigation. 
It provides for compensation in cases where 
a doctor or any other medical personnel 
assisting in the treatment of a patient is 
proved to be negligent. The element of fault 
plays a vital role in negligence cases from 
the very beginning thus, the tort system has 
been criticised on the grounds that burden 
of proof rests on the patient or the plaintiff 
(in medical negligence claims) (Puteri 
Nemie, n.d.). Although this is the stance of 
the law, it has to be noted to prove that a 
doctor had positively breached a standard 
of care is onerous for the plaintiff due to the 
existence of the Bolam test. Due to the fact 
that the plaintiff has the burden of proving 
the doctor or defendant had strayed from the 
recognised standard of care, the profession 
imposes upon the plaintiff the burden of 
establishing first what the professional 
standard of care is in any given case and 
that the defendant has departed from it 
(Puteri Nemie, n.d.). It should be noted 
that the only acceptable manner of proof 
of the standard of care is another doctor’s 
testimony. This has led to a situation where 
a patient has to face the unwillingness of 
one doctor to provide evidence against a 
fellow doctor. This kind of scenario has been 
dubbed as “conspiracy of silence” (Salgo 
v Leland Stanford Jr. University Board of 
Trustees 317 O 2d 1093 (1960)), which has 
effectively prevented plaintiffs of numerous 
medical negligence cases from prevailing 
at trial and deterred others from instituting 
litigation. 
This article examines the role of expert 
evidence in the context of the standard of 
care required in the medical profession in 
medical negligence litigation in Malaysia. 
The Bolam principle has long been the 
criterion in Malaysia in assessing a doctor’s 
level of competency (NorchayaTalib , 
2010). However, being aware of some 
of the criticisms of the Bolam principle, 
the authors of the present study are of the 
opinion that the interests of the public and 
the medical profession are best served when 
scientifically sound and unbiased expert 
evidence testimony is readily available 
to plaintiffs and defendants in medical 
negligence litigation. In this article, the 
authors argue that although expert medical 
opinion of accepted practice is relevant, it 
should not be conclusive of the standard 
of care. 
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THE BOLAM PRINCIPLE
Before addressing the Bolam principle, 
it is important to briefly state the facts in 
Bolam v Friern Hospital Management 
Committee [(1957) 2 All ER 118]. In this 
case, the allegation was that a doctor had 
been negligent in administering electro-
convulsive treatment (ECT) or therapy 
to a patient without a relaxant drug or 
restraining his convulsive movements. 
There were two medical opinions about 
the treatment of patients who receive ECT. 
One recommended that relaxant drugs 
should be used, and the other advised 
against it because of the risk of fractures. 
The patient, who had not been warned of 
the risks involved, had not been given the 
relaxant drugs, and had not been restrained 
when receiving the treatment. He suffered 
fractures as a result of not being properly 
restrained when receiving the treatment. The 
patient filed a suit on the basis of negligence 
against the doctor. McNair J in his direction 
to the jury at p.121stated: 
… A doctor is not guilty of negligence 
if he has acted in accordance with 
a practice accepted as proper by 
a responsible body of medical 
men skilled in that particular art. 
Putting it another way round, a 
doctor is not negligent if he is 
acting in accordance with such 
a practice, merely because there 
is a body of opinion that takes a 
contrary view…
Although the statement above was only 
a direction to the jury in a High Court case, 
it was adopted by the House of Lords with 
approval in later cases and has regularly 
been restated in clinical negligence cases. 
The Bolam principle states that a doctor 
is not negligent if he or she has acted 
with a practice accepted as proper by a 
responsible body of medical professionals 
skilled in that particular art: it is immaterial 
that there exists another body of opinion 
that would not have adopted the approach 
taken by the doctor in question. As long as 
a “responsible body of medical opinion” 
exists that approves of the actions of the 
doctor, then the doctor escapes liability 
(Harpwood, 2009; Kian, 2003). What the 
law requires from the doctor is to prove that 
what he or she did is acceptable within the 
medical profession.
It cannot be denied that the Bolam 
principle puts a patient or a plaintiff in a 
very difficult position to prove that the 
doctor or the defendant had breached a 
standard of care owed to him or her. The 
Bolam principle allows the doctor to rely on 
a body of responsible medical professionals 
or medical opinion to absolve him or her 
of professional medical negligence. The 
courts have always interpreted the Bolam 
principle by stating that they cannot find 
a defendant negligent as long as there is a 
common practice or custom that supports the 
defendant’s actions. However, the problem 
with the “custom test” is that it is viewed as 
purely descriptive as opposed to what ought 
to be done by medical practitioners (Puteri 
Nemie, n.d.). Hence, the most commonly 
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accepted manner of proof of professional 
standard as per the Bolam principle is 
another doctor’s testimony. 
The authors are of the opinion that the 
Bolam principle despite being criticised 
has its own merits. For example, if the 
Bolam principle is not followed, there 
can be adverse effects to the medical 
profession and society at large. Doctors will 
opt for “defensive medicine” namely the 
treatment for their patients they consider to 
be “legally safe” even if they believe such 
a treatment may not be strictly warranted. 
This may be unnecessarily expensive and 
time-consuming. Apart from that, it will 
also encourage medical litigation, which 
in turn will increase premiums and overall 
healthcare costs. This might affect good 
doctor/patient relationships and possibly 
dissuade young doctors from joining high 
risk specialist fields for fear of litigations 
(Shanmugam, 2002). 
Cases before the Advent of Bolam 
Principle
In the context of this article, a short analysis 
of several contentious cases is important 
as to what prompted the court to come up 
with the Bolam principle. This is relevant 
in understanding the Bolam principle as 
well as the reasons why courts have left 
such an important matter in the hands of 
the medical profession instead of enacting 
it into a law. Before the courts established 
the Bolam principle, they found it difficult 
to set a standard for the medical profession 
and majority of them opined that such 
matters should be left to medical judgments. 
In Mahon v Osborne [(1939) 2 KB 14], 
the plaintiff was admitted to the hospital 
for an abdominal operation. He later died 
and a swab was found in his body. The 
plaintiff was entitled to call expert evidence 
that the accident would not have occurred 
without negligence. In this case, the Court 
of Appeal held that the standard of care is 
to be measured by expert evidence. Lord 
Justice Goddard at p.47 stated: 
I would not for a moment attempt 
to define in vacuo the extent of 
a surgeon’s duty in an operation 
beyond saying that he must use 
reasonable care, nor can I imagine 
anything more than disastrous to 
the community than to leave it to a 
jury or to a judge, if sitting alone, 
to lay down what is proper to do 
in any particular case without the 
guidance of witnesses who are 
qualified to speak on the subject… 
As it is the task of the surgeon to 
put swabs in, so it is his task to 
take them out, and in that task he 
must use the degree of care which is 
reasonable in the circumstances and 
that must depend on the evidence. 
From the above, it is important to note 
that Justice Goddard seems to be aware of the 
fact that the medical profession has always 
been shrouded with a lot of complications 
and technicalities, which a judge may not be 
able to comprehend. Therefore, the message 
seems to be very clear that in order to reach 
a just and accurate decision, medical experts 
should be the ones helping the court to deal 
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with such complex issues. Hence, a doctor 
cannot be said to be guilty of negligence 
if he or she has acted in accordance with 
a practice accepted by a responsible body 
of professional opinion. In other words, a 
doctor who is in breach of his or her duty 
has to be judged by his peers and not by 
the court. 
In the case of Roe v Minister for Health 
[(1954) 2 QB 66] the plaintiff became 
paralysed after receiving an injection in 
hospital. Phenol had leaked into the syringe 
causing the paralysis. At this time, it was 
known that phenol could get into the syringe 
through invisible cracks. The court held that 
the defendants were not negligent as, judged 
by the standard of a reasonable person at the 
time of the accident, they could not have 
avoided the accident. The court would not 
condemn a defendant with ‘the benefit of 
hindsight’. Perhaps, it is vital here to make 
a reference to the passage from the judgment 
of Denning LJ which indeed provides a clue 
to the philosophy of the Bolam principle. His 
Lordship at p.83 said: 
If the anaesthetists had foreseen 
that the ampoules might get cracked 
with cracks that could not be 
detected on inspection, they would 
no doubt have dyed the phenol a 
deep blue; and this would expose 
the contamination. But I do not 
think that their failure to foresee 
this was negligence. It is so easy 
to be wise after the event and to 
condemn as negligence that which 
is only a misadventure. We ought 
always to be on our guard against 
it, especially in cases against 
doctors and hospitals. Medical 
science has conferred great benefits 
on mankind, but these benefits are 
attended by considerable risks. 
Every surgical operation is attended 
by risks. 
Based on the statement above, Denning 
LJ had in mind that medicine as a profession 
has pros and cons in the course of treatment. 
Being aware of the considerable risks in the 
medical profession, perhaps it is justified the 
decision taken by the courts that a doctor or 
defendant should be judged by his peers in 
medical negligence cases. 
The other relevant case to cite here 
is the case of Hunter v Hantley [(1955) 
SLT 231, (1955) SC 200]. In this case, the 
plaintiff claimed the doctor treating him 
was negligent in using a needle which was 
unsuitable. Lord President Clyde at p.217 
stated: 
To succeed in an action based on 
negligence, whether against a 
doctor or anyone else, it is of course 
necessary to establish a breach of 
that duty to take care which the law 
requires, and the degree of want of 
care which constitutes negligence 
must vary with circumstances… 
But where the conduct of a doctor, 
or indeed of any professional man, 
is concerned, the circumstances 
are not so precise and clear as in 
the normal case. In the realm of 
diagnosis and treatment there is 
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ample scope for genuine difference 
of opinion and one man clearly 
is not negligent merely because 
his conclusion differs from that 
of other professional men, nor 
because he has displayed less 
skill or knowledge than others 
would have shown. The true test 
for establishing negligence in 
diagnosis and treatment on the part 
of the doctor is whether he has been 
proved to be guilty of such failure as 
no doctor of ordinary skill would be 
guilty of acting with ordinary care.
From the above, there is no doubt 
that there is a heavy burden of proof on a 
claimant in order to file a case against the 
doctor or a professional man on the basis 
of negligence. This is due to the fact that 
the claimant would have to establish that 
the doctor or a professional man deviated 
from the ordinary skill that is required as 
far as the profession is concerned. In order 
to succeed in his or her claim, the claimant 
would have to establish that no professional 
man of ordinary skill would have followed 
the course taken by the defendant i.e. in the 
course of diagnosis and treatment. Thus, 
the usual practice of other professionals in 
the same area will be a significant factor in 
determining this issue. 
“Looking at the decisions of the courts 
before the advent of the Bolam principle, it 
is evident that the earlier cases have paved 
the way for the development of the Bolam 
test as used in medical negligence cases. 
Medicine is clearly an inexact science of 
which its outcome is rarely predictable. It 
would be a disservice to the community 
at large if liability were to be imposed 
on hospitals and doctors for everything 
that happens to go wrong (Puteri Nemie, 
n.d.). Hence, there must be a proper tool 
to gauge the standard of care of a doctor in 
determining his or her liability in medical 
negligence cases” (Puteri Nemie, n.d.). 
Challenges to the Bolam Principle
The justification for the Bolam principle 
was stated by Lord Scarman in Maynard v 
West Midlands RHA (1985) 1 All ER at p. 
635 when he said: 
Differences of opinion exist, and 
continue to exist, in the medical as 
in other professions. There is seldom 
any one answer exclusive of all 
others to problems of professional 
judgment. A court may prefer one 
body of opinion to the other; but 
that is no basis for a conclusion of 
negligence. 
Based on this, the authors would 
like to point out that regardless of the 
justification of the Bolam principle a number 
of criticisms were expressed over the years. 
Some of the criticisms are: first, it failed to 
draw a distinction between ‘what is done’ 
and ‘what ought to be done’. The key point 
of contention is that ‘what is done’ even if 
by most people, could still be considered 
negligent if it falls below the standard of 
what ought to be done. Second, the Bolam 
principle is seen as unfair to claimants and 
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too protective of professionals. This is due to 
the fact that the doctor is only considered to 
be negligent based on what is determined by 
a body of professionals. Third, the rule is yet 
another example of professions protecting 
one another. It is important to note that in 
the case of medical negligence following 
the Bolam principle, courts have resorted 
to doctor’s testimony for help. Fourth, the 
Bolam principle requires the defendant to 
conform to a ‘responsible’ body of medical 
opinion. However, the Bolam principle 
has failed to address or define what is a 
‘responsible’ body of medical opinion? 
The case has also failed to address the issue 
of how many doctors would be required 
to form a ‘responsible body of medical 
opinion? Moreover, we are bound to face 
some daunting tasks in dealing with the 
issue of a ‘responsible’ body of medical 
opinion especially where the practice or 
specialty has few registered practitioners. 
Fifth, the Bolam principle rests on the 
assertion that it is entirely up to the medical 
profession to decide how much information 
they should give to their patients. Although 
this approach appears to be favourable to 
those in the medical profession, we ought 
to remember that issues involving ethics 
and the fundamental rights of individuals 
should not be disregarded at whatever cost 
(Teff, 1998). 
Despite the challenges to the Bolam 
principle, the authors are of the opinion 
that the principle strikes a win-win situation 
between the rights of doctors, patients and 
the general public. If the Bolam principle is 
not followed, there can be adverse effects 
to the medical profession and society at 
large. For example, doctors will opt for 
“defensive medicine” as well as choosing 
the treatment for their patients they consider 
to be “legally safe” even if they believe 
that such treatments may not be strictly 
warranted. This may be unnecessarily 
expensive and time-consuming. 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND 
APPLICATION OF THE BOLAM 
PRINCIPLE IN MALAYSIA
This section will address the developments 
in the application of the Bolam principle 
in Malaysia. In Malaysia, the Bolam 
principle has long been the criterion in 
assessing a doctor’s level of competency 
(NorchayaTalib, 2010). In other words, the 
Bolam principle has been well received 
by the Malaysian courts in determining 
the doctor’s standard of care in medical 
negligence cases. In the context of this 
article, the authors do not intend to highlight 
all the cases, but only a few for the sake of 
better understanding. The selection of these 
cases is based on two criteria. First, where 
the Bolam principle was applied especially 
in cases of diagnosis and treatment. Second, 
where the Bolam principle was not applied 
especially in cases of seeking information or 
medical opinion/advice before a treatment 
could be administered by a doctor. One of 
the earliest cases where the Bolam principle 
was applied is the case of Swamy v Mathews 
[(1968) 1 MLJ 138]. In this case, the 
majority judgment accepted the testimony 
of the defendant doctor and his explanation 
that the prescription and the dosage given 
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to the plaintiff, although at variance with 
the manufacturer’s recommendation, were 
made based on his personal experience. 
The majority decision in discounting the 
contrary evidence clearly showed the 
reliance of the court to the so-called medical 
opinion. The reasonableness of the treatment 
was not examined by the court. The medical 
practitioner was not found to be negligent on 
the ground that medical practitioners need 
not have the highest degree of skill. 
The development in the application 
of the Bolam principle in Malaysia can 
also be seen from the decision of the Privy 
Council in Chin Keow v Government of 
Malaysia [(1967) 2 MLJ 45]. In this case, 
the trial judge, Ong J., adopted the Bolam 
test of negligence and found the doctor to 
be negligent for prescribing a penicillin 
injection as a routine treatment for the 
patient and that he did so without asking 
a single perfunctory question to attempt 
to discover whether she was sensitive to 
the drug. Such is not considered a proper 
practice by a responsible body of medical 
opinion. The Federal Court, however, 
rejected Ong J.’s findings of negligence 
but on appeal, the Privy Council adopted 
Ong J.’s decision. The basis for the Privy 
Council’s adoption of Ong J’s decision was 
due to the fact that it was expressly written 
on the patient’s card that she was allergic 
to penicillin. 
Another relevant case law demonstrating 
the development in the application of the 
Bolam principle in Malaysia is the case of 
Elizabeth Choo v Government of Malaysia 
& Anor [(1970) 2 MLJ171]. In this case, 
Raja Azlan Shah J stated that a professional 
will not be deemed to be negligent if he 
or has taken steps that would normally 
be taken by others who are in the same 
position. However, a professional who takes 
a different view from another professional 
in the same profession is not necessarily in 
breach of his duty of care provided that his 
opinion is still in accordance with what is 
regarded as proper by a body of similarly 
skilled professionals. Thus, applying the 
Bolam principle to this issue, the court held 
that the anaesthetist is not negligent as he 
had followed the general and approved 
practice. The technique that he adopted was 
approved by a responsible body of medical 
professionals since 1956. Therefore, it did 
not matter if there was another body of 
opinion that would have taken a contrary 
view. 
It is also important to note that the 
judicial decision in Elizabeth Choo was 
further consolidated in the case of Kow 
Nan Seng v Nagamah&Ors [(1982) 1 MLJ 
128]. Here, the Federal Court held that the 
duty of a doctor to his or her patient is to 
adhere to the reasonable standard of care 
and expertise. If there were differences in 
opinion in terms of the types of plasters 
that may be used, the defendant would 
not be liable as long as he or she opted for 
a treatment that was generally accepted 
within the profession. The court applied 
the Bolam test and held that in this case, 
the defendant was liable as all doctors were 
aware of the fact that if a plaster was applied 
blood circulation would be affected . It is 
important to note that in this case there were 
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conflicting opinions whether a complete 
plaster cast or a plaster slab is to be used.
In Malaysia, being aware of the 
challenges to the Bolam principle, the 
courts on certain occasions have departed 
from this well established principle - a 
familiar concept to most doctors. This 
departure perhaps could best be understood 
in the context of the existence of a different 
test for the medical profession in cases of 
provision of information. The first decision 
in which the court refused to apply the 
Bolam principle and instead adopted the 
principles set forth in Rogers v Whitaker 
[(1992) HCA 58; (1992) 175 CLR 479] 
was in Kamalam a/p Raman &Orsv Eastern 
Plantation Agency (Johore) Sdn Bhd & Anor 
[(1996) 4 MLJ 674]. In Rogers vs Whitaker, 
Mrs Whitaker became almost totally blind in 
her left eye as a result of a condition known 
as sympathetic ophthalmia, after a surgery 
was conducted on her right eye. The surgery 
was not conducted negligently, but the 
plaintiff’s allegation was grounded on the 
defendant’s failure to advise her of the risk 
of sympathetic ophthalmia, which resulted 
in her condition. In Kamalam a/p Raman & 
Ors vs Eastern Plantation Agency (Johore) 
SdnBhd& Anor, the trial judge did not regard 
himself as being bound to find medical 
practitioners negligent if there is a body of 
medical opinion that approved the doctor’s 
practice. In this case, Mr D was taken to the 
estate clinic after complaining of giddiness 
and having fainted at work. The attending 
doctor (D1), having examined Mr D, 
prescribed medication and discharged him. 
On two subsequent occasions thereafter, 
Mr D was attended to by D2. Eight days 
after the first visit to the clinic, as a result 
of giddiness and fits, Mr D was taken to a 
hospital for emergency treatment and was 
subsequently transferred to another hospital. 
He died the next day, the cause of death 
being stroke, which could and should have 
been diagnosed much earlier. 
The full reception of the Whitaker test 
(i.e. as laid down in the Australian case of 
Rogers v Whitaker [(1992) HCA 58; (1992) 
175 CLR 479] in Malaysia may be seen 
in the Federal Court judgment in Foo Fio 
Nav vs Dr Soo Fook Mun [(2007) 1 MLJ 
593]. In this case, the plaintiff was injured 
when the car she was travelling in was 
involved in a collision. She was taken to 
the nearest hospital, the Asunta Hospital. 
The plaintiff had dislocated her cervical 
vertebrae which caused much pain in her 
neck region. A cervical collar was placed 
around it to prevent unnecessary movement. 
After conservative treatment for a few 
days, the defendant surgeon performed two 
surgeries. After the first surgery, the plaintiff 
was paralysed and when medication failed 
to improve her condition, the defendant 
performed the second surgery. The plaintiff 
claimed that the defendant failed to explain 
the risk of paralysis arising from the first 
surgery, and instead informed her that it was 
a minor procedure, on the basis of which 
she gave her consent. The second surgery 
was performed without her consent being 
obtained. The plaintiff stated that had she 
been warned of the risk of paralysis she 
would not have readily agreed to proceed 
with the first surgery. 
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The Federal Court held that the 
applicable test in determining the standard 
of care of a medical practitioner in relation 
to disclosure of information and risks is 
not the Bolam test. Instead, the medical 
practitioner has a duty to warn a mentally 
competent patient of the risks of a proposed 
procedure so as to enable the patient to 
decide whether to proceed or decline it 
accordingly. Professional opinion and 
acceptable professional practice, but its 
reasonableness may be questioned by the 
courts (PuteriNemie , 2007). 
Bolitho- Reinterpretation of the Bolam 
Principle
Having addressed the development in the 
application of the Bolam principle above, 
it is important to make a reference to the 
decision of the House of Lords in Bolithov 
City & Hackney Health Authority [(1997) 
4 All ER 771] as a reinterpretation of the 
Bolam principle. Bolitho was a clinical 
negligence case that reached the House of 
Lords. The central legal issue was whether 
or not non-intervention by a doctor caused 
the plaintiff’s injury. The facts of the case 
were that Patrick Bolitho, a two-year-old 
child, suffered catastrophic brain damage as 
a result of cardiac arrest due to respiratory 
failure. The senior paediatric registrar did 
not attend to the child, as she ascribed to a 
school of thought that medical intervention, 
under those particular circumstances, would 
have made no difference to the end result. 
Liability was denied on the grounds that 
even if she had attended to the case, she 
could not have done anything that would 
have materially affected the outcome. 
This view was supported by an impressive 
and responsible body of medical opinion. 
However, Lord Browne-Wilkinson rejected 
the argument put forward. According to 
Lord Browne-Wilkinson, the court has to 
be satisfied that the exponents of the body 
of opinion relied upon can demonstrate that 
such an opinion has a logical basis.
The judgment in Bolitho might impact 
upon the principle of Bolam in that, the court 
is likely to take a much more interventionist 
stand in appraising the professed standard 
of care (Samanta & Samanta, 2003). This is 
due to the fact that the courts will still have 
a say in the hearing of medical negligence 
cases by looking at two stages during the 
trial process. The first stage would be for 
the court to assess whether the decision 
had responsible peer support, based on an 
approach that was structured, reasoned and 
defensible. The professed opinion must 
withstand ‘logical analysis’. This broadly 
reflects the Bolam test as it is known. The 
second stage, and this is where Bolitho 
might really take effect, is to assess on a 
‘risk analysis’ basis the validity of accepting 
the treatment or course of action offered by 
the defendant and, more importantly, the 
validity of rejecting competing decisions. In 
undertaking such an analysis, the court may 
look at a number of factors, including the 
magnitude of the risk, the comparative risks 
of alternative interventions and treatments, 
the seriousness of the consequences, the 
ease by which the risk might be avoided, 
and the implications of such avoidance in 
terms of finances and resources of healthcare 
(Samanta & Samanta, 2003). 
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CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The test for the standard of care in law 
expected of doctors is based on the principle 
laid down in Bolam’s case. Hence, a medical 
practitioner is deemed as failing to reach 
the standard of care if a responsible body 
of r medical peers does not supports the 
action in question. However, the judgment 
in Bolitho suggests that expert opinion now 
has to withstand rigorous scrutiny from 
the judiciary. But the Bolam principle had 
not given much scope to the judiciary to 
intervene and had ensured that any medical 
treatment that conforms to a body of 
professional opinion is not negligent. 
The authors are of the opinion that 
Bolitho has not curbed the power delegated 
to the medical profession by Bolam. Bolitho 
simply requires the judge to scrutinise 
medical evidence in the same fashion as 
they would do to expert evidence in any 
other type of cases of negligence. The 
decision only allows them to scrutinise 
medical opinions. To that extent, a faithful 
application of both Bolam and Bolitho 
would mean that the court will accept the 
views of a respected body of experts. It is 
useful to remind ourselves that the House of 
Lords in Bolitho was careful to say that it is 
only in rare cases and would “very seldom” 
be right for a judge to reach a conclusion that 
the views genuinely held by a competent 
expert are unreasonable. Bolitho has still not 
changed the status quo and judges have not 
been made more knowledgeable in medical 
matters through the outcome of the case 
(PuteriNemie, n.d., 2004, 2007). 
Despite the acceptance of the Bolam 
test in Malaysia, there is still room for 
improvement especially regarding the 
quality of medical expert witness testimony. 
First, doctors need to be better educated 
and trained with necessary skills and 
knowledge so that they could perform a 
better job as expert witnesses in medical 
negligence cases. Second, a doctor who 
is called as an expert witness by the court 
should be very familiar and well versed with 
the medical field in question that is being 
heard by the court. Third, doctors should 
not protect their peers in the profession 
without putting forward a solid justification 
during the course of trial. Medical/expert 
opinions need to be scrutinised thoroughly. 
So doctors who are summoned as experts 
in medical negligence cases must act fairly, 
objectively and above all impartially in the 
process of providing their expert opinions 
to the court. Fourth, doctors/physicians 
appearing as expert witnesses in court 
should be very familiar with the medical 
standards required before accepting the role 
of an expert witness. Fifth, it is also vital 
that doctors/physicians expert witnesses’ 
exercise care in assessing the relationship 
between the breach in the standard of care 
and the patient’s condition.
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